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Abstract
We consider a banking network represented by a system of stochastic differential
equations coupled by their drift. We assume a core-periphery structure, and that the
banks in the core hold a bubbly asset. The banks in the periphery have not direct
access to the bubble, but can take initially advantage from its increase by investing
on the banks in the core. Investments are modeled by the weight of the links, which
is a function of the robustness of the banks. In this way, a preferential attachment
mechanism towards the core takes place during the growth of the bubble. We then
investigate how the bubble distort the shape of the network, both for finite and infinitely
large systems, assuming a non vanishing impact of the core on the periphery. Due to
the influence of the bubble, the banks are no longer independent, and the law of large
numbers cannot be directly applied at the limit. This results in a term in the drift
of the diffusions which does not average out, and that increases systemic risk at the
moment of the burst. We test this feature of the model by numerical simulations.
Keywords: Bubbles, Systemic risk, Financial networks, Mean field models
1 Introduction
Contagion mechanisms within a banking system and corresponding measurement and man-
agement of systemic risk have become central topics in macroprudential regulation in partic-
ular since the last financial crisis. The urge for the development of new quantitative methods
to deal with these topics has triggered various lines of active research on systemic risk.
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One stream of research aims at extending the traditional regulatory framework of monetary
risk measures, that quantify the risk of financial institutions based on a stand alone basis,
to multivariate systemic risk measures that take as a primitive the whole financial system.
For an overview about this topic, see Biagini et al. [6, 7], Bisias et al. [10], Chen et al. [16],
Drapeau et al. [21], Feinstein et al. [24], Hoffmann et al. [30, 31], Kromer et al. [35] and
references therein.
Another popular ansatz to analyse systemic risk is based on explicit network models for the
financial system and the study of potential default cascades due to various contagion affects.
In the seminal work of Eisenberg and Noe [22] and its many extensions (see e.g. Hurd [33]
and references therein) cascade processes in static, deterministic network models are analized
by computing endogenously determined clearing/equilibrium payment vectors. Within the
framework of random graph theory, cascade processes are studied in large financial random
networks by means of law-of-large number effects in Amini and Minca [1], Amini et al. [2, 3],
Detering et al. [18, 19, 20] and Hurd [33], and in finite random networks by Elliott et al.
[23], Gai and Kapadia [27].
The approach we present in this paper is placed within the theory of mean-field equations first
introduced in the influential papers of McKean [37, 38]. In recent years, this framework has
been applied to the study of systemic risk in large financial networks where, contrary to the
static network models mentioned above, the dynamic evolution of a network of interacting
financial institutions is studied by means of a system of interacting diffusions. In this setting
the diffusions represent e.g. the wealth, monetary reserves, or other more general indicators
for the health of financial institutions, and are tied together through a term in the drift that
implies the network structure. A first simple model in this direction is given in Fouque and
Ichiba [25], where a system of SDEs is proposed with dynamics
dX it =
λ
n
n∑
j=1
(Xjt −X it)dt+ σdW it , 0 ≤ t <∞, (1.1)
where W = (W 1t , . . . ,W
n
t )t≥0 is a standard n-dimensional Brownian motion and λ, σ > 0.
Here, the X i stand for the log-monetary reserves of banks, and the drift terms λ(Xjt −X it)
represent the connections between banks in the network. In this case, the borrowing and
lending rate λ is supposed to be the same for every couple of banks. When the network size
n grows towards infinity, it is a well-know result (see Sznitman [41]) that due to law-of-large-
number effects the diffusions in (1.1) converge towards their mean-field limit
dY¯ it = λ
(
E[Y¯t]− Y¯ it
)
dt+ σdW it , 0 ≤ t <∞.
Thus, for large networks propagation of chaos applies and the evolution of the X i asymp-
totically de-couples due to averaging effects, which allows to asymptotically describe the
complex system by a representative particle evolution. The simple model in (1.1) to study
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systemic risk has been generalized in various ways in a number of articles, see e.g. Carmona
et al. [14, 15] where mean-field games are considered, Fouque and Sun [26] where the prob-
ability distributions of multiple default times is approximated, Garnier et al. [28, 29] and
Battiston et al. [5] where a tradeoff between individual and systemic risk in a banking net-
work is described, and Chong and Klu¨ppelberg [17], Kley et al. [34] where partial mean-field
limits are studied.
In this paper the main objective is to extend the model in (1.1) such that the effect of a
financial speculation bubble on the evolution of the network and the evolving systemic risk
can be studied. It is a common understanding that bubbles are intimately connected with
financial crises, and many historical crises indeed originated after the burst of a bubble (e.g.
the Great Depression of the 1930s and the financial crisis of 2007-2008). This causality is
investigated for example in Brunnermeier [11] and statistically confirmed in Brunnermeier
and Schanabel [13]. However, it seems that literature on mathematical models that deal
with this question is very scarce.
We here take a first step towards filling this gap and specify a model for the network of
financial robustness of the institutions, introduced by Battiston et al. [5] and Hull and White
[32] as an indicator of agent’s creditworthiness or distance to default and also considered in
Kley et al. [34], by a system of coupled diffusions. The banks affect each other’s robustness
by being financially exposed to each other, for example because of cross-holdings, which
results in a coupling of the drift terms. Following the setting in Battiston [4], we then
assume that a fixed number of banks are directly investing in a bubble that affects their
financial robustness. The remaining banks have the possibility to participate in the bubble by
investing in the bubble banks. This results in a typical core/periphery structure for financial
networks, where here the core is formed by the banks holding the bubble. Contrarily to the
literature on mean-field models mentioned above, where the coupling drift rates representing
the weighted network connections are constant, we allow for heterogeneity of the drift rates
in that they depend on the robustness of the institution. More precisely, the rates depend
on the robustness of the attracting institution with a delay δ > 0, where the delay reflects
the fact that the banks’ investment do not immediately react to changes in the system.
This results in a preferential attachment mechanism where the attractiveness of a node does
not depend on its degree, but on its “fitness”, as proposed by Bianconi and Baraba`si [9].
Due to this behavior, the bubble causes a distortion in the network evolution: during the
expanding phase of the bubble, the network structure shifts towards an increasingly intense
and centralized connectivity due to the strong growth of the bubbly banks’ robustness, which
then causes instability in case the bubble bursts.
We then study the behaviour of the system when its size gets large. More precisely, we let the
number of periphery banks go towards infinity, but keep the number of core banks holding
the bubble constant and assume that their impact on the system does not vanish when the
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total number of banks goes to infinity. In this way the bubble produces a common stochastic
source in the system that does not not average out even for large networks. Our main result
then determines a partial mean-field limit for the system where the influence of the bubble is
represented via stochastic interaction with the core banks even in the limit. Because of this
term, also the banks in the periphery are affected by a potential bubble burst. This effect is
amplified by the impossibility to immediately desinvest when the robustness of some banks
decreases due to the delay δ. We also refer to Chong and Klu¨ppelberg [17] where the authors
investigate partial mean-field limits in a different setting, without taking into account the
delay and the influence of the bubble.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model
and some technical results. In Section 3 we define the limit system and prove a convergence
result, whereas in Section 4 we perform Monte Carlo simulations both in the finite and in
the limit systems in order to numerically investigate the impact of the bubble on systemic
risk.
2 The model
Let (Ω,F ,F, P ) be a filtered probability space endowed with a (m + n + 2)-dimensional
Brownian motion W¯ = (W 1t , . . . ,W
n
t ,W
B,1
t , . . . ,W
B,m
t , B
1
t , B
2
t )t≥0, m, n ∈ N, where F =
(Ft)t∈R+ is the natural filtration of W¯ . We consider a network of m + n banks, consisting
of m banks holding a bubbly asset in their portfolio (also referred to as core), and n banks
that do not directly hold the bubbly asset (also referred to as periphery).
By following a similar approach as in Kley et al. [34], we model the robustness of the banks
in the system. This coefficient dynamically evolves and represents a measure of how healthy
a bank remains in stress situations. Let ρi,n = (ρi,nt )t≥0, i = 1, . . . n, and ρ
k,B = (ρk,Bt )t≥0,
k = 1, . . . , m, be the robustness of banks not holding and holding the bubble, respectively.
We assume that they satisfy the following system of stochastic differential delay equations
(SDDEs) for t ≥ δ, δ > 0,
dρi,nt =
(
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρj,nt−δ − Ant−δ)(ρj,nt −Ant ) +
1
m
m∑
k=1
fB(ρk,Bt−δ − Ant−δ) (ρk,Bt − Ant )
)
+ λ(Ant − ρi,nt )dt+ σ1dW it , (2.1)
dρk,Bt =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρi,nt−δ − Ant−δ)(ρi,nt − Ant ) +
1
m− 1
m∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=k
fB(ρℓ,Bt−δ − Ant−δ)(ρℓ,nt −Ant )
)
dt
+ λ(Ant − ρk,Bt )dt+ σ2dW k,Bt + dβt, (2.2)
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where λ > 0, σ1 > 0, σ2 > 0 and
Ant =
1
m+ n
(
n∑
r=1
ρr,nt +
m∑
h=1
ρh,Bt
)
, t ≥ δ, (2.3)
is the mean of the robustness of all the banks in the network at time t. For t ∈ [0, δ),
we assume that (ρi,ns )s∈[0,δ), (ρ
k,B
s )s∈[0,δ), i = 1, . . . , n, k = 1, . . . , m, satisfy (2.1)-(2.2) with
δ = 0, by following the approach of Mao [36]. We also suppose that ρi,n0 = ρ0 > 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , n.
The process β = (βt)t≥0 in (2.2) represents the influence of the asset price bubble on the
robustness of core banks and has dynamics
dβt = µtdt+ σBdB
1
t , t ≥ 0, (2.4)
where σB > 0 and µ is an adapted process satisfying
dµt = b˜(µt)dt+ σ˜(µt)dB
2
t , t ≥ 0, (2.5)
where b˜, σ˜ fulfill the usual Lipschitz and sublinear growth conditions such that there exists
a unique solution of (2.5) , satisfying∫ t
0
E[|µs|2]ds <∞, 0 ≤ t <∞. (2.6)
Later on in Section 4 we will specify a concrete model for the bubbly evolution in (2.4).
The interdependencies of the banks’ robustness and corresponding contagion effects are spec-
ified through the drifts in (2.1) and (2.2). The term λ(Ant − ρi,nt ) represents an attraction of
the individual robustness towards the average robustness of the system with rate λ as in the
classical mean-field model (1.1). In addition to the homogeneous average term, we introduce
the terms of type fP (ρj,nt−δ −Ant−δ)(ρj,nt −Ant ) and fB(ρk,Bt−δ −Ant−δ) (ρk,Bt −Ant ) that represent
a robustness-dependent evolution of the network connectivity: for typically positive and in-
creasing fB and fP , bank i is the more connected to bank j the higher bank j’s robustness is
above the average. In this way, the evolution of the bubble alters the connectivity structure
of the network according to a model of preferential attachment. Moreover, the propensity
of a node i to attract future links not only depends on the current level of robustness of
i, but also on the robustness of the banks already connected to i. This induces a form of
preferential preferential attachment, which creates a strong clustering effect. This change
in network structure then comes along with an increasing systemic risk and instability in
case the bubble burst, as noted by Battiston [4]. Further we introduce the delay δ > 0 to
reflect the fact that the bank i’s investment decisions does not immediately react to changes
in bank j’s robustness. Note that when there are no bubble banks and fP = λ, the system
(2.1)-(2.2) collapses to the basis mean-field model in (1.1).
We assume the following hypothesis on fB and fP .
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Assumption 2.1. The functions fB, fP : (R,B(R)) → (R+,B(R+)) are measurable, Lip-
schitz continuous and such that also the functions FB(x) := xfB(x), F P (x) := xfP (x),
x ∈ R, are Lipschitz continuous, i.e.
|f ℓ(x)− f ℓ(y)| ≤ K1|x− y|, x, y ∈ R, ℓ = B,P, (2.7)
and
|xf ℓ(x)− yf ℓ(y)| ≤ K2|x− y|, x, y ∈ R, ℓ = B,P, (2.8)
with 0 < K1, K2 <∞.
Note that (2.8) implies that fB and fP are bounded, since if f(x)x is Lipschitz then
|f(x)x| = |f(x)x− f(0) · 0| ≤ K2|x|. (2.9)
Example 2.2. We have that f(x) = 1 + 2 arctan(x)/π satisfies Assumption 2.1: f takes
values in [0, 2], and both f and F (x) = xf(x) are Lipschitz, because they have bounded
derivative.
In particular, f is increasing, so that if ρjt > ρ
i
t then the link towards j is bigger then the
link towards i. If the robustness ρjt of bank j is equal to the average A
n
t in (2.3), then the
link towards bank j has weight f(0) = 1, if ρjt > A
n
t the link has weight bigger than 1 and if
ρjt < A
n
t the link has weight less than 1. If all the banks have the same robustness, we have
an homogenous network, where all the links have weight equal to 1.
Furthermore, any constant function clearly satisfies Assumption 2.1. For such a choice, we
have a static and homogenous network.
Proposition 2.3. Under Assumption 2.1, for every δ ≥ 0 there exists a unique strong
solution for the system of SDEs (2.1)-(2.2). Moreover, it holds
sup
0≤s≤t
E[|ρis|2] <∞, 0 < t <∞, i = 1, . . . , n, (2.10)
sup
0≤s≤t
E[|ρk,Bs |2] <∞, 0 < t <∞, k = 1, . . . , m. (2.11)
Proof. Suppose by simplicity λ = 1. We start by proving existence and uniqueness of the
strong solution of (2.1)-(2.2) when δ = 0. In this case we can write the system of SDEs given
by (2.1),(2.2) and (2.5) as an (m+ n+ 1)-dimensional SDE
dXt = b(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dW¯t, t ≥ 0, (2.12)
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where
b(x) =


1
n−1
∑n
j=2 f
P (xj − x¯)(xj − x¯) + 1m
∑m+n
k=n+1 f
B(xk − x¯)(xk − x¯) + x¯− x1,
...
1
n−1
∑n−1
j=1 f
P (xj − x¯)(xj − x¯) + 1m
∑m+n
k=n+1 f
B(xk − x¯)(xk − x¯) + x¯− xn
1
n
∑n
j=1 f
P (xj − x¯)(xj − x¯) + 1m−1
∑m+n
k=n+2 f
B(xk − x¯)(xk − x¯) + x¯− xn+1
...
1
n
∑n
j=1 f
P (xj − x¯)(xj − x¯) + 1m−1
∑m+n−1
k=n+1 f
B(xk − x¯)(xk − x¯) + x¯− xm+n
b˜(xm+2)


,
(2.13)
with x¯ = 1
m+n
∑m+n
i=1 xi. Here σ(x) is a (n+m+ 1)× (n+m+ 1) block matrix of the form
σ(x) =

 Σ1(x) 0 00 Σ2(x) 0
0 0 σ˜(xm+2)

 , (2.14)
where Σ1(x) is a n×n diagonal matrix with diagonal (σ1, . . . , σ1) and Σ2(x) is them×(m+1)
matrix
Σ2(x) =


σ2 0 . . . 0 σB
0 σ2 . . . 0 σB
...
...
. . . 0 σB
0 0 . . . σ2 σB

 .
We use Theorem 9.11 in Pascucci [39] to prove existence and uniqueness of the strong solution
of (2.12), and that the second moments of the solution are finite. To this purpose, we show
that b(·) and σ(·) defined in (2.13) and (2.14), respectively, are Lipschitz continuous in x
and that there exists some C such that
‖σ(x)‖2 + ‖b(x)‖2 ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖2).
We begin by proving the first condition. The Lipschitz property clearly holds for σ(·), since
σ˜(·) is Lipschitz by hypothesis. Given x = (x1, . . . , xm+n), x′ = (x′1, . . . , x′m+n) ∈ Rm+n, we
show that there exists a constant K¯ ∈ (0,∞) such that
‖b(x)− b(x′)‖ ≤ K¯‖x− x′‖.
For the first entry of (2.13) we have
|b1(x)− b1(x′)| ≤ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
|fP (xj − x¯)(xj − x¯)− fP (x′j − x¯′)(x′j − x¯′)|
+
1
m
m+n∑
k=n+1
|fB(xk − x¯)(xk − x¯)− fB(x′k − x¯′)(x′k − x¯′)|+ |x¯− x¯′|+ |x1 − x′1|,
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and by Assumption 2.1 we have
|b1(x)− b1(x′)| ≤ K2 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
|(xj − x¯)− (x′j − x¯′)|+K2
1
m
m+n∑
k=n+1
|(xk − x¯)− (x′k − x¯′)|
+ |x¯− x¯′|+ |x1 − x′1|
≤ K2
(
1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
|xj − x′j |+
1
m
m+n∑
k=n+1
|xk − x′k|
)
+ (2K2 + 1)|x¯− x¯′|+ |x1 − x′1|
≤ K2
(
1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
|xj − x′j |+
1
m
m+n∑
k=n+1
|xk − x′k|
)
+
2K2 + 1
m+ n
m+n∑
i=2
|xi − x′i|
+ |x1 − x′1|.
Then, since for z1, . . . , zN ∈ R it holds
(∑N
i=1 |zi|
)2
≤ N∑Ni=1 |zi|2, we have
|b1(x)− b1(x′)|2 ≤ 6(m+ n)
(
(K2)
2
(
1
(n− 1)2
n∑
j=2
|xj − x′j |2 +
1
m2
m+n∑
k=n+1
|xk − x′k|2
))
+ 6(m+ n)
(
(2K2 + 1)
2 1
(m+ n)2
m+n∑
i=1
|xi − x′i|2 + |x1 − x′1|2
)
≤ C1‖x− x′‖2,
for a suitable constant C1 > 0. Similarly,
|bi(x)− bi(x′)| ≤ Ci‖x− x′‖2, 2 ≤ i ≤ m+ n,
for a suitable constant Ci > 0, whereas
|bm+2(x)− bm+2(x′)| = |b˜(xm+2)− b˜(x′m+2)| ≤ Kµ|xm+2 − x′m+2|,
where Kµ is the Lipschitz constant for the function b˜(·) in (2.5). Then we obtain
‖b(x)− b(x′)‖2 =
m+n+1∑
i=1
|bi(x)− bi(x′)|2 ≤
(
m+n+1∑
i=1
Ci +K
2
µ
)
‖x− x′‖2. (2.15)
The second condition, i.e.
‖σ(x)‖2 + ‖b(x)‖2 ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖2), (2.16)
for some C > 0, holds because of Assumption 2.1 and the hypothesis on σ˜(·).
Inequalities (2.10) and (2.11) then follow by Theorem 9.11 in Pascucci [39], and in particular
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by estimation (A.2) in the Appendix.
When δ > 0, equation (2.12) becomes
dXt = b¯(Xt, Xt−δ)dt+ σ¯(Xt, Xt−δ)dWt, t ≥ δ, (2.17)
where σ¯(x, y) = σ(x) as in (2.14) and
b(x, y) =


1
n−1
∑n
j=2 f
P (yj − y¯)(xj − x¯) + 1m
∑m+n
k=n+1 f
B(yk − y¯)(xk − x¯) + x¯− x1,
...
1
n−1
∑n−1
j=1 f
P (yj − y¯)(xj − x¯) + 1m
∑m+n
k=n+1 f
B(yk − y¯)(xk − x¯) + x¯− xn
1
n
∑n
j=1 f
P (yj − y¯)(xj − x¯) + 1m−1
∑m+n
k=n+2 f
B(yk − y¯)(xk − x¯) + x¯− xn+1
...
y 1
n
∑n
j=1 f
P (yj − y¯)(xj − x¯) + 1m−1
∑m+n−1
k=n+1 f
B(yk − y¯)(xk − x¯) + x¯− xm+n
b˜(xm+2)


.
By Theorem 3.1 in Mao [36, chapter 5], to prove existence and uniqueness of the solution it
suffices to show that the linear growth condition
‖b¯(x, y)‖2 ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖2 + ‖y‖2) (2.18)
holds and that b¯ is Lipschitz in the variable x uniformly in y, i.e. that there exists a constant
K˜ ∈ (0,∞) such that
‖b¯(x, y)− b¯(x′, y)‖2 ≤ K˜‖x− x′‖2 (2.19)
for all y ∈ R, x, x′ ∈ Rm+n. Property (2.18) can be proven by computations similar to the
ones used for showing (3.14). For the Lipschitz condition we have
|b¯1(x, y)− b¯1(x′, y)| ≤ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
|fP (yj − y¯)||(xj − x¯)− (x′j − x¯′)|
+
1
m
m+n∑
k=n+1
|fB(yk − y¯)||(xk − x¯)− (x′k − x¯′)|+ |x¯− x¯′|+ |x1 − x′1|.
Hence, as fB and fP are bounded by K2, the computations to show (2.19) are identical to
the ones for (2.15).
In order to prove (2.10) and (2.11), we apply the same argument used in the proof of Theorem
3.1 in Mao [36, chapter 5]: on [0, δ] we have by hypothesis a classic stochastic differential
equation, and by inequality (9.15) in Theorem 9.11 in Pascucci [39] it holds
E[ sup
0≤s≤δ
‖Xs‖2] <∞. (2.20)
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On the interval [δ, 2δ], we can write equation (2.17) as
dXt = b¯(Xt, ξt)dt+ σ¯(Xt, ξt)dWt, δ ≤ t ≤ 2δ,
where ξt = Xt−δ. Once the solution on [0, δ] is known, this is again a classic SDE (without
delay) with initial value Xδ = ξ0, so that by Theorem 9.11 in Pascucci [39], there exists a
constant C2δ > 0 such that
E[ sup
δ≤s≤2δ
‖Xs‖2] ≤ C2δ
(
1 + E[‖Xδ‖2]
)
e2δC2δ , (2.21)
which is finite by (2.20). Repeating this argument on the interval [2δ, 3δ], we obtain
E[ sup
2δ≤s≤3δ
‖Xs‖2] ≤ C3δ
(
1 + E[‖X2δ‖2]
)
e3δC3δ ≤ C3δ
(
1 + E[ sup
δ≤s≤2δ
‖Xs‖2]
)
e3δC3δ <∞
by (2.21). Recursively we have
E[ sup
(k−1)δ≤s≤kδ
‖Xs‖2] <∞.
Then,
sup
0≤s≤t
E[‖Xs‖2] = sup
s∈[k¯δ,(k¯+1)δ]
E[‖Xs‖2] <∞, (2.22)
for some k¯ with [k¯δ, (k¯ + 1)δ] ⊆ [0, t]. ✷
3 Mean field limit
We now study a mean field limit for the system of banks (2.1)-(2.2) for large n.
Define the processes ρ˜i = (ρ˜it)t≥0, i = 1, . . . , n, ρ¯
k,B = (ρ¯k,Bt )t≥0, k = 1, . . . , m, and ν = (νt)t≥0
as the solutions of the following system of SDEs for t ≥ δ:
dρ˜it = −λρ˜itdt+ σ1dW it , (3.1)
dνt =
(
ϕ(t, t− δ) + 1
m
m∑
k=1
fB
(
ρ¯k,Bt−δ − νt−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ]
)(
ρ¯k,Bt − νt − E[ρ˜it]
)
+ λE[ρ˜it]
)
dt,
(3.2)
dρ¯k,Bt =
(
ϕ(t, t− δ) + 1
m− 1
m∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=k
fB
(
ρ¯ℓ,Bt−δ − νt−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ]
)(
ρ¯ℓ,Bt − νt − E[ρ˜it]
))
dt
+
(
µt + λ(E[ρ˜
i
t] + νt − ρ¯k,Bt )
)
dt+ σ2dW
k,B
t + σBdB
1
t , (3.3)
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with
ϕ(t, t− δ) := E [fP (ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ]) (ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it])] , t ≥ δ. (3.4)
For t ∈ [0, δ] we assume that (ρ˜t)0≤t≤δ, (νt)0≤t≤δ and (ρ¯k,Bt )0≤t≤δ satisfy (3.1)-(3.3) for δ = 0,
with initial conditions ρ˜i0 = ρ0 ∈ R, ν0 = 0, ρ¯k,B0 = ρk,B0 ∈ R.
Note that in equation (3.2) the expression of ϕ is independent of the choice of ρ˜i since ρ˜i,
i = 1, . . . , n, are identically distributed. For the same reason, the process ν in (3.2) does not
depend on ρ˜i.
Set
ρ¯i := ρ˜i + ν, i = 1, . . . , n. (3.5)
In particular,
ρ¯it =ρ¯
i
δ +
∫ t
δ
(
ϕ(s, s − δ) + 1
m
m∑
k=1
fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − νs−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ])
(
ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is]
)
+ λ(E[ρ˜is]− ρ˜is)
)
ds
+ σ1W
i
s , t ≥ δ. (3.6)
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumption 2.1, for every δ ≥ 0 there exists a unique strong
solution of the system of SDEs (3.1)-(3.3). In particular, it holds
sup
0≤s≤t
E[|νs|2] <∞, 0 < t <∞, (3.7)
sup
0≤s≤t
E[|ρk,Bs |2] <∞, 0 < t <∞, k = 1, . . . , m. (3.8)
Proof. For the sake of simplicity we take λ = 1. It is well known that (3.1) admits a unique
strong solution. As before, we start by proving existence and uniqueness of the strong
solution of (3.2)-(3.3) when δ = 0. The system given by (3.2), (3.3) and (2.5) can be written
as an (m+ 2)-dimensional SDE
dXt = b(t, Xt)dt+ σ(t, Xt)dWt, t ≥ 0, (3.9)
where W = (WB,1t , . . . ,W
B,m
t , B
1
t , B
2
t )t≥0, and
b(t, x) =


ϕ(t) + 1
m
∑m
k=1 f
B(xk − x1 − ψ(t))(xk − x1 − ψ(t)) + ψ(t),
ϕ(t) + 1
m−1
∑m+1
ℓ=3 f
B(xℓ − x1 − ψ(t))(xℓ − x1 − ψ(t)) + x1 + xm+2 − x2 + ψ(t),
...
ϕ(t) + 1
m−1
∑m
ℓ=2 f
B(xℓ − x1 − ψ(t))(xℓ − x1 − ψ(t)) + x1 + xm+2 − xm+1 + ψ(t),
b˜(xm+2)


(3.10)
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with ψ(t) = E[ρ˜it] and
ϕ(t) := E
[
fP
(
ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it]
) (
ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it]
)]
, t ≥ 0. (3.11)
The (m+ 2)× (m+ 2) matrix σ(x) has the form
σ(t, x) =


0 0 . . . 0 0 0
σ2 0 . . . 0 σB 0
0 σ2 . . . 0 σB 0
...
...
. . . 0 σB 0
0 0 . . . σ2 σB 0
0 0 . . . 0 0 σ˜(xm+2)


. (3.12)
As before, we rely on Theorem 9.11 in Pascucci [39]. We have to show that b and σ defined
in (3.10) and (3.12) respectively are Lipschitz continuous in x uniformly in t and that for
each constant T > 0 there exists some C˜ such that for all t ∈ [0, T ] it holds
‖σ(t, x)‖2 + ‖b(t, x)‖2 ≤ C˜(1 + ‖x‖2).
We begin by proving the first condition. The Lipschitz property clearly holds for σ, since σ˜
is Lipschitz by hypothesis. Take now x = (x1, . . . , xm+2), x
′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
m+2). We have that
|b1(t, x)− b1(t, x′)|
≤ 1
m
m∑
k=1
|fB (xk − x1 − ψ(t)) (xk − x1 − ψ(t))− fB (x′k − x′1 − ψ(t)) (x′k − x′1 − ψ(t)) |
≤ K2 1
m
m∑
k=1
|(xk − x1 − ψ(t))− (x′k − x′1 − ψ(t))|
= K2
(
1
m
m∑
k=1
|xk − x′k|+ |x1 − x′1|
)
.
Similarly, for k = 2, . . . , m+ 1 we have
|bk(t, x)− bk(t, x′)| ≤ K2
(
1
m− 1
m∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=k
|xℓ − x′ℓ|+ |x1 − x′1|+ |xk − x′k|
)
.
With computations as in the proof of Proposition 2.3 we obtain that for t ≥ 0 it holds
‖b(t, x)− b(t, x′)‖2 ≤ C¯‖x− x′‖2, (3.13)
for some appropriate C¯.
We now show the second condition, i.e. that for t ∈ [0, T ] it holds
‖σ(t, x)‖2 + ‖b(t, x)‖2 ≤ C˜(1 + ‖x‖2), (3.14)
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for some C˜ > 0. By (3.12) we can focus only on ‖b(t, x)‖. The computations are here the
same as in Proposition 2.3, but we have to estimate the term ϕ(t) from (3.11). Since
|ϕ(t)| = ∣∣E [fP (ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it]) (ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it])]∣∣ ≤ K2E[|ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it]|],
≤ K2
(
E[|ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it]|2]
)1/2 ≤ K2
(
σ21
2
(1− e−2t)
)1/2
≤ K2 σ1√
2
,
(3.14) follows by the proof of Proposition 2.3.
Inequalities (3.7) and (3.8) follow since, by Theorem 9.11 in Pascucci [39], (3.13) and (3.14)
guarantee that the second moments of the solution of (3.9) are finite.
The proof for the case δ > 0, based on Theorem 3.1 in Mao [36, chapter 5], is analogous to
the one of Proposition 2.3. ✷
Denote |x− y|∗t = sups≤t |xs − ys|. We have the following
Theorem 3.2. Fix i ∈ N. Under Assumption 2.1, for any t ∈ [0,∞) and δ ≥ 0 it holds
lim
n→∞
(
E
[|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗t ]+ E[|ρk,B − ρ¯k,B|∗t ]) = 0, k = 1, . . . , m,
where ρi,n, ρ¯i, ρk,B, ρ¯k,B are defined in (2.1), (3.6), (2.2), (3.3) respectively.
Before proving Theorem 3.2, we give the following
Proposition 3.3. Under Assumption 2.1, for 0 ≤ δ <∞, it holds
lim
n→∞
∫ δ
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is − A¯ns )(ρ¯is − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds = 0, (3.15)
and
lim
n→∞
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯is − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds = 0,
for 0 ≤ δ ≤ t <∞, where ρ˜i and ρ¯i satisfy (3.1) and (3.6), respectively, and
A¯nt =
1
m+ n
(
n∑
r=1
ρ¯rt +
m∑
h=1
ρ¯h,Bt
)
, t ≥ 0. (3.16)
Proof. We limit ourselves to prove the second limit, since the first one follows as a particular
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case. Let us write, for t ≥ δ > 0,
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯it−δ − A¯nt−δ)(ρ¯it − A¯nt )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ]
) (
ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it]
)] ∣∣∣]
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∣∣∣fP (ρ¯it−δ − A¯nt−δ)(ρ¯it − A¯nt )− fP (ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ])(ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it])∣∣∣
]
+ E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ])(ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it])− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ]
) (
ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it]
)] ∣∣∣],
since ρ¯i, i = 1, . . . , n are identically distributed and the same holds for ρ˜i, i = 1, . . . , n.
By (3.5) we have that
A¯nt =
1
m+ n
(
n∑
r=1
ρ¯rt +
m∑
h=1
ρ¯h,Bt
)
=
1
m+ n
(
nνt +
n∑
r=1
ρ˜rt +
m∑
h=1
ρ¯h,Bt
)
,
so that
lim
n→∞
A¯nt = νt + lim
n→∞
1
m+ n
n∑
r=1
ρ˜rt = νt + E[ρ˜
i
t], a.s.,
by (2.11) and the law of large numbers, as ρ˜i, i = 1, . . . , n, are independent and identically
distributed. Then we have
lim
n→∞
fP (ρ¯it−δ − A¯nt−δ)(ρ¯it − A¯nt ) =fP
(
νt−δ + ρ˜
i
t−δ − (νt−δ + E[ρ˜it−δ])
) (
νt + ρ˜
i
t − (νt + E[ρ˜it])
)
= fP
(
ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ]
) (
ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it]
)
a.s. (3.17)
We now prove that the family of random variables { 1
n
∑n
i=1 f
P (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯is− A¯ns )}n∈N is
uniformly integrable for every s ∈ [δ, t], so that convergence almost surely implies convergence
in L1.
By point (iii) of Theorem 11 in Protter [40, chapter 1] it is enough to prove that for every
s ∈ [δ, t],
sup
n
E

(1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯is − A¯ns )
)2 <∞. (3.18)
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For every s ∈ [δ, t], we have that
E
[(1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯is − A¯ns )
)2]
≤ (K2)2E
[( 1
n
n∑
i=1
|ρ¯is − A¯ns |
)2]
≤ (K2)2E
[(
(1− n/(m+ n))|νs|+
∣∣ρ˜is∣∣+ 1m+ n
n∑
r=1
|ρ˜rs|+
1
m+ n
m∑
h=1
∣∣ρ¯h,Bs ∣∣ )2
]
≤ (K2)2E
[(
|νs|+
∣∣ρ˜is∣∣+ 1n
n∑
r=1
|ρ˜rs|+
1
m
m∑
h=1
∣∣ρ¯h,Bs ∣∣ )2
]
≤ 4(K2)2
(
E
[
|νs|2 + |ρ˜is|2 +
m∑
k=1
|ρ¯k,Bs |2
]
+ E
[(1
n
n∑
r=1
|ρ˜rs|
)2])
≤ 4(K2)2
(
E
[
|νs|2 + |ρ˜is|2 +
m∑
k=1
|ρ¯k,Bs |2
]
+
1
n
E
[ n∑
r=1
|ρ˜rs|2
])
.
≤ 4(K2)2
(
E
[
|νs|2 + |ρ˜is|2 +
m∑
k=1
|ρ¯k,Bs |2
]
+ E[|ρ˜is|2]
)
<∞,
by (3.7) and (3.8) and because E|ρ˜is|2] <∞. Hence, { 1n
∑n
i=1 f
P (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯is − A¯ns )}n∈N
is uniformly integrable and we obtain therefore by (3.17) that
lim
n→∞
E
[∣∣∣fP (ρ¯it−δ − A¯nt−δ)(ρ¯it − A¯nt )− fP (ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ])(ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it])∣∣∣
]
= 0.
Moreover, for δ ≤ s ≤ t it holds
E
[∣∣∣fP (ρ¯it−δ − A¯nt−δ)(ρ¯it − A¯nt )− fP (ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ])(ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it])∣∣∣
]
≤ K1(E[|ρ¯it − A¯nt |] + E[|ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it|]),
where the second term belongs to L1 ([δ, t]) and does not depend on n. On the other hand,
we have∫ t
0
E[|ρ¯is − A¯ns |]ds ≤
∫ t
0
E
[
|ρ˜is|+ (1− n/(m+ n)) |νs|+
1
m+ n
n∑
r=1
|ρ˜rs|+
1
m+ n
m∑
h=1
|ρ¯h,Bs |
]
ds
≤
∫ t
0
E
[
2|ρ˜is|+ |νs|+ |ρ¯h,Bs |
]
ds
≤ t sup
0≤s≤t
E
[
2|ρ˜is|+ |νs|+ |ρ¯h,Bs |
]
<∞, (3.19)
by (3.7) and (3.8). We can then apply the dominated convergence theorem to obtain, for
t ∈ [δ,∞),
lim
n→∞
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣fP (ρ¯is−δ−A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯is−A¯ns )−fP (ρ˜is−δ−E[ρ˜is−δ])(ρ˜is−E[ρ˜is])∣∣∣
]
ds = 0, t ≥ δ. (3.20)
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It remains to show that for t ≥ δ it holds
lim
n→∞
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ˜is−δ−E[ρ˜is−δ])(ρ˜is−E[ρ˜is])−E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds = 0.
(3.21)
Since ρ˜i, i = 1, . . . , n, are independent and identically distributed, we have that, for δ ≤ s ≤
t,
lim
n→∞
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ˜is−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ])(ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is])− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣] = 0.
Then limit (3.21) follows by the dominated convergence theorem, by Assumption 2.1 and
since the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process has finite moments, see the computations in (3.19).
✷
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We suppose by simplicity λ = 1 and we proceed by steps, starting
from the case when 0 ≤ t < δ, i.e. when there is no delay in equations (2.1)-(2.2) and
(3.2)-(3.3).
First step: case 0 ≤ t < δ.
For every i = 1, . . . , n and t ∈ [0, δ), we have
ρi,nt − ρ¯it =
∫ t
0
∆nsds,
where
∆ns =
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρj,ns − Ans )(ρj,ns −Ans )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)]
+
1
m
m∑
k=1
(
fB(ρk,Bs − Ans )(ρk,Bs −Ans )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs − νns − E[ρ˜is])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])
)
− (ρi,ns − ρ¯is) + (Ans − A¯ns ) + (A¯ns − E[ρ˜is]− νs).
Thus
|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗t =sup
s≤t
∣∣∣∣
∫ s
0
∆nudu
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
s≤t
∫ s
0
|∆nu| du =
∫ t
0
|∆nu| du.
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Therefore, for every i = 1, . . . , n and t ≥ 0, we have
E[|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗t ] ≤ E
[∫ t
0
|∆ns |ds
]
≤
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(fP (ρj,ns −Ans )(ρj,ns −Ans )− fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns ))
∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
m
m∑
k=1
(
fB(ρk,Bs − Ans )(ρk,Bs − Ans )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )
) ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[
1
m
m∑
k=1
∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs − νns − E[ρ˜is])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E[|ρi,ns − ρ¯is|]ds+
∫ t
0
E[|Ans − A¯ns |]ds+
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − E[ρ˜is]− νs|] ds. (3.22)
By (2.8) it holds
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(fP (ρj,ns − Ans )(ρj,ns −Ans )− fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns ))
∣∣∣]ds
≤ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣fP (ρj,ns − Ans )(ρj,ns − Ans )− fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns )∣∣∣
]
ds
≤ K2 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣(ρj,ns − Ans )− (ρ¯js − A¯ns )∣∣∣
]
ds
≤ K2 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρj,ns − ρ¯js∣∣ + ∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣] ds
= K2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρi,ns − ρ¯is∣∣] ds+K2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣] ds, t ≥ 0. (3.23)
By (2.3) and (3.16) we have that
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣] ds ≤
∫ t
0
E
[ 1
m+ n
n∑
r=1
|ρr,ns − ρ¯rs|
]
ds+
∫ t
0
E
[ 1
m+ n
m∑
k=1
∣∣ρh,Bs − ρ¯h,Bs ∣∣ ]ds
≤
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρi,ns − ρ¯is∣∣] ds+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρk,Bs − ρ¯k,Bs ∣∣] ds, t ≥ 0, (3.24)
because all ρi, i = 1, . . . , n, and ρk,B, k = 1, . . . , m, are identically distributed, respectively.
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We can conclude by (3.23) and (3.24) that
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(fP (ρj,ns −Ans )(ρj,ns −Ans )− fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns ))
∣∣∣]ds
≤ 2K2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρi,ns − ρ¯is∣∣] ds+K2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρk,Bs − ρ¯k,Bs ∣∣] ds
≤ 2K2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρi,n − ρ¯i∣∣∗
s
]
ds+K2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρk,B − ρ¯k,B∣∣∗
s
]
ds, t ≥ 0. (3.25)
Similarly,∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
m
m∑
k=1
(
fB(ρk,Bs − Ans )(ρk,Bs − Ans )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )
) ∣∣∣]ds
≤ K2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρi,n − ρ¯i∣∣∗
s
]
ds+ 2K2
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρk,B − ρ¯k,B∣∣∗
s
]
ds t ≥ 0. (3.26)
From (3.22), (3.24), (3.25) and (3.26) we have that for t ≥ 0 it holds
E[|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗t ]
≤ (3K2 + 2)
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρi,n − ρ¯i∣∣∗
s
]
ds+ (3K2 + 1)
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρk,B − ρ¯k,B∣∣∗
s
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[ ∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs − νns − E[ρ˜is])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − E[ρ˜is]− νs|] ds, t ≥ 0. (3.27)
Proceeding as before, we find
E[|ρk,B − ρ¯k,B|∗t ]
≤ (3K2 + 1)
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρi,n − ρ¯i∣∣∗
s
]
ds+ (3K2 + 2)
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρk,B − ρ¯k,B∣∣∗
s
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[ ∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs − νns − E[ρ˜is])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is − A¯ns )(ρ¯is − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − νs − E[ν˜is|]] ds, (3.28)
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so that, summing up (3.27) and (3.28), we have
E[|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗t ] + E[|ρk,B − ρ¯k,B|∗t ]
≤ (6K2 + 3)
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρi,n − ρ¯i∣∣∗
s
]
ds+ (6K2 + 3)
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣ρk,B − ρ¯k,B∣∣∗
s
]
ds
+ 2
∫ t
0
E
[ ∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs − νns − E[ρ˜is])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is − A¯ns )(ρ¯is − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+ 2
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − νs − E[ν˜is|]] ds, t ≥ 0. (3.29)
We can now apply Gronwall’s Lemma and obtain
E[|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗t ] + E[|ρk,Bt − ρ¯k,Bt |∗s]
≤ e(6K2+3)t
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+ e(6K2+3)t
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is − A¯ns )(ρ¯is − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+ 2e(6K2+3)t
∫ t
0
E
[ ∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣
]
ds
+ 2e(6K2+3)t
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − νs − E[ν˜is|]] ds, t ≥ 0. (3.30)
We can write∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
≤
(
1
n− 1 −
1
n
)∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯js − A¯ns )(ρ¯js − A¯ns )
∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is − A¯ns )(ρ¯is − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+
1
n
∫ t
0
E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)]
ds t ≥ 0,
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with (
1
n− 1 −
1
n
)∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯is − A¯ns )(ρ¯is − A¯ns )
∣∣∣]ds
≤ 1
n(n− 1)
∫ t
0
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
E[|fP (ρ¯is − A¯ns )(ρ¯is − A¯ns )|]ds
=
1
n
∫ t
0
E[|fP (ρ¯is − A¯ns )(ρ¯is − A¯ns )|]ds ≤
K2
n
∫ t
0
E[|ρ¯is − A¯ns |]ds, t ≥ 0,
where the last term tends to zero when n→∞ by (3.19).
Since it can be shown, for t ≥ 0, that
lim
n→∞
∫ t
0
E
[ ∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣
]
ds = 0,
and
lim
n→∞
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − νs − E[ν˜is|]] ds = 0, t ≥ 0,
with the same proof as for (3.20), then by (3.15) we obtain the result for t ∈ [0, δ).
Second step: case t ∈ [δ, 2δ).
For every i = 1, . . . , n and t ≥ δ, we have
|ρi,nt − ρ¯it| ≤
∣∣∣∣
∫ δ
0
(ρi,ns − ρ¯is)ds+
∫ t
δ
∆δ,ns ds
∣∣∣∣ ,
where
∆δ,ns =
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρj,ns−δ −Ans−δ)(ρj,ns − Ans )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ]
) (
ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it]
)]
+
1
m
m∑
k=1
(
fB(ρk,Bs−δ − Ans−δ)(ρk,Bs −Ans )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − νs−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])
)
− (ρi,ns − ρ¯is) + (Ans − A¯ns ) + (A¯ns − E[ρ˜is]− νs|).
Thus
|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗t = sup
s≤t
∣∣∣∣
∫ δ
0
(ρi,nu − ρ¯iu)du+
∫ s
δ
∆δ,nu du
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫ δ
0
|ρi,nu − ρ¯iu|du+ sup
δ≤s≤t
∫ s
δ
∣∣∆δ,nu ∣∣ du
=
∫ δ
0
|ρi,nu − ρ¯iu|du+
∫ t
δ
∣∣∆δ,nu ∣∣ du, δ ≤ t. (3.31)
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For every i = 1, . . . , n, we have
E
[∫ t
δ
|∆δ,ns |ds
]
≤
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(fP (ρj,ns−δ − Ans−δ)(ρj,ns − Ans )− fP (ρ¯js−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯js − A¯ns ))
∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯js−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯js − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣ 1
m
m∑
k=1
(
fB(ρk,Bs−δ −Ans−δ)(ρk,Bs −Ans )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )
) ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
δ
E
[
1
m
m∑
k=1
∣∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − νs−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣∣
]
ds
+
∫ t
δ
E[|ρi,ns − ρ¯is|]ds+
∫ t
0
E[|Ans − A¯ns |]ds+
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − E[ρ˜is]− νs|] ds, δ ≤ t. (3.32)
By (2.8) it holds
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(fP (ρj,ns−δ − Ans−δ)(ρj,ns −Ans )− fP (ρ¯js−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯js − A¯ns ))
∣∣∣]ds
≤ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣fP (ρj,ns−δ −Ans−δ) ((ρj,ns − Ans ) + (ρ¯js − A¯ns )) ∣∣∣
]
ds
+
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣(ρ¯js − A¯ns ) (fP (ρj,ns−δ −Ans−δ)− fP (ρ¯js−δ − A¯ns−δ)) ∣∣∣
]
ds
≤ K2
∫ t
δ
E[|ρi,ns − ρ¯is|]ds+K2
∫ t
δ
E[|Ans − A¯ns |ds
+
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρ¯is − A¯ns ∣∣ ∣∣fP (ρi,ns−δ −Ans−δ)− fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)∣∣] ds. (3.33)
We have that for δ ≤ t∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρ¯is − A¯ns ∣∣ ∣∣fP (ρi,ns−δ −Ans−δ)− fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)∣∣] ds
≤
∫ t
δ
(
E
[∣∣ρ¯is − A¯ns ∣∣2]ds)1/2 (E [∣∣fP (ρi,ns−δ − Ans )− fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns )∣∣2])1/2 ds
≤
(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρ¯is − A¯ns ∣∣2] ds
)1/2(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣fP (ρi,ns−δ −Ans−δ)− fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)∣∣2] ds
)1/2
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≤
(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρ¯is − A¯ns ∣∣2] ds
)1/2(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣fP (ρi,ns−δ −Ans−δ)2 − fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)2∣∣] ds
)1/2
≤
√
2K2
(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρ¯is − A¯ns ∣∣2] ds
)1/2(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣fP (ρi,ns−δ − Ans−δ)− fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)∣∣] ds
)1/2
≤
√
2K1K2
(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρ¯is − A¯ns ∣∣2] ds
)1/2(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρi,ns−δ − ρ¯is−δ∣∣+ ∣∣Ans−δ − A¯ns−δ∣∣] ds
)1/2
,
where we have used that |a− b|2 ≤ |a2 − b2| for a, b ∈ R+.
Then, setting Gn1 (t) :=
(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρ¯is − A¯ns ∣∣2] ds)1/2 , by (3.33) we have∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(fP (ρj,ns−δ − Ans−δ)(ρj,ns −Ans )− fP (ρ¯js−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯js − A¯ns ))
∣∣∣]ds
≤ K2
∫ t
δ
E[|ρi,ns − ρ¯is|]ds+K2
∫ t
δ
E[|Ans − A¯ns |ds
+
√
2K1K2G
n
1 (t)
(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρi,ns−δ − ρ¯is−δ∣∣ + ∣∣Ans−δ − A¯ns−δ∣∣] ds
)1/2
, δ ≤ t. (3.34)
Since∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρi,ns−δ − ρ¯is−δ∣∣+ ∣∣Ans−δ − A¯ns−δ∣∣] ds = E
[∫ t
δ
(∣∣ρi,ns−δ − ρ¯is−δ∣∣+ ∣∣Ans−δ − A¯ns−δ∣∣) ds
]
= E
[∫ t−δ
0
(∣∣ρi,nu − ρ¯iu∣∣+ ∣∣Anu − A¯nu∣∣) du
]
≤
∫ δ
0
E[
∣∣ρi,nu − ρ¯iu∣∣+ ∣∣Anu − A¯nu∣∣]du, δ ≤ t < 2δ,
we can rewrite (3.34) as∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(fP (ρj,ns−δ − Ans−δ)(ρj,ns −Ans )− fP (ρ¯js−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯js − A¯ns ))
∣∣∣]ds
≤ K2
∫ t
δ
E[|ρi,ns − ρ¯is|]ds+K2
∫ t
δ
E[|Ans − A¯ns |ds
+
√
2K1K2G
n
1 (t)
(∫ δ
0
E
[∣∣ρi,ns − ρ¯is∣∣ + ∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣] ds
)1/2
, δ ≤ t. (3.35)
Similarly,∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
m
m∑
k=1
(
fB(ρk,Bs−δ −Ans−δ)(ρk,Bs − Ans )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )
) ∣∣∣]ds
≤ K2
∫ t
δ
E[|ρk,Bs − ρ¯k,Bs |]ds+K2
∫ t
δ
E[|Ans − A¯ns |ds
+
√
2K1K2G
n
2 (t)
(∫ δ
0
E
[∣∣ρk,Bs − ρ¯k,Bs ∣∣ + ∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣] ds
)1/2
, δ ≤ t. (3.36)
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with Gn2 (t) :=
(∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns ∣∣2] ds)1/2 .
From (3.24), (3.31), (3.32), (3.35) and (3.36) we obtain
E[|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗t ]
≤ (3K2 + 2)
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρi,n − ρ¯i∣∣∗
s
]
ds+ (3K2 + 1)
∫ t
δ
E[|ρk,B − ρ¯k,B|∗s]ds
+
√
2K1K2G
n
1 (t)
(∫ δ
0
E
[∣∣ρi,ns − ρ¯is∣∣+ ∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣] ds
)1/2
+
√
2K1K2G
n
2 (t)
(∫ δ
0
E
[∣∣ρk,Bs − ρ¯k,Bs ∣∣+ ∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣] ds
)1/2
+
∫ t
0
E
[ ∣∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − νs−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣∣
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯js−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯js − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ δ
0
E[|ρi,ns − ρ¯is|]ds+
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − E[ρ˜is]− νs|] ds, δ ≤ t < 2δ. (3.37)
At the same way, by (2.2) and (3.3) we have
E[|ρk,B − ρ¯k,B|∗t ]
≤ (3K2 + 1)
∫ t
δ
E
[∣∣ρi,n − ρ¯i∣∣∗
s
]
ds+ (3K2 + 2)
∫ t
δ
E[|ρk,B − ρ¯k,B|∗s]ds
+
√
2K1K2G
n
1 (t)
(∫ δ
0
E
[∣∣ρi,ns − ρ¯is∣∣+ ∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣] ds
)1/2
+
√
2K1K2G
n
2 (t)
(∫ δ
0
E
[∣∣ρk,Bs − ρ¯k,Bs ∣∣+ ∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣] ds
)1/2
+
∫ t
0
E
[ ∣∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − νs−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣∣
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯is − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ δ
0
E[|ρk,Bs − ρ¯k,Bs |]ds+
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − νs − E[ν˜is|]] ds, δ ≤ t < 2δ. (3.38)
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Summing up (3.37) and (3.38) we find
E[|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗t ] + E[|ρk,B − ρ¯k,B|∗t ]
≤ (6K2 + 3)
∫ t
0
(
E[|ρi,n − ρ¯i|∗s] + E[|ρk,B − ρ¯k,B|∗s]
)
ds
+
√
2K1K2(G
n
1 (t) +G
n
2 (t))
(∫ δ
0
(
E[|ρi,ns − ρ¯is|] + E[|ρk,Bs − ρ¯k,Bs |] + E
[∣∣Ans − A¯ns ∣∣]) ds
)1/2
(3.39)
+
∫ t
0
E
[ ∣∣∣fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯k,Bs − A¯ns )− fB(ρ¯k,Bs−δ − νs−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ])(ρ¯k,Bs − νs − E[ρ˜is])∣∣∣
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n− 1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
fP (ρ¯js−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯js − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+
∫ t
0
E
[∣∣∣ 1
n
n∑
i=1
fP (ρ¯is−δ − A¯ns−δ)(ρ¯is − A¯ns )− E
[
fP
(
ρ˜is−δ − E[ρ˜is−δ]
) (
ρ˜is − E[ρ˜is]
)] ∣∣∣]ds
+ 2
∫ t
0
E
[|A¯ns − νs − E[ν˜is|]] ds, δ ≤ t < 2δ. (3.40)
With the same computations used in the first step of the proof, we show that the last
four terms of (3.40) converge to zero when n → ∞ by the proof of Proposition 3.3. The
term in (3.39) also goes to zero when n → ∞, by the first step of the proof and because
limn→∞[G
n
1 (t)+G
n
2(t)] <∞, by (3.19). Then applying Gronwall’s Lemma to (3.40) we prove
the result for t ∈ [δ, 2δ).
The result then follows by proceeding in the same way for all the steps t ∈ [kδ, (k + 1)δ),
k ≥ 2. ✷
4 Numerical analysis
We now study by numerical simulations how the system described in Section 3 reacts to
the growth and the burst of a bubble. In particular, we investigate how a bank not holding
the bubbly asset can be affected by a bubble burst through contagion mechanisms. We first
consider the case of (2.1)-(2.2), i.e. of a network with a finite number of banks, and then we
analyze the limit system (3.1)-(3.3).
The bubble has the dynamics specified in Biagini et al. [8], i.e. it solves (2.4) with
µt = MtΛt(−kβt + 2µ¯t), σt = 2σ¯MtΛt, t ≥ 0,
where M = (Mt)t∈[0,T ], Λ = (Λt)t∈[0,T ] are respectively a measure of illiquidity and the so
called resiliency, µ¯ = (µ¯t)t≥0 is the drift of the signed volume of market orders (buy market
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orders minus sell market orders) and σ¯ > 0. Here, the illiquidity M is supposed to be a
geometric Brownian motion, i.e.
dMt = Mt(µ
Mdt+ σMdB3t ), t ≥ 0.
with µM ∈ R and σM > 0. We choose the same function f for both core and periphery
banks in (2.1)-(2.2), i.e. fB = fP = f . In particular, we take f(x) = 1 + 2 arctan(x)/π, as
in Example 2.2.
4.1 Risk analysis for the finite case
We first focus on the system (2.1)-(2.2). We investigate how the first bank reacts when
banks holding the bubble are in trouble. Specifically, we here introduce and compute the
risk measure
Riskiα = − sup
x∈R
{[
1
Ns
Ns∑
k=1
1{
(ρi,n,k
τk+∆
−ρi,n,kτk )/ρ
i,n,k
τk
≤x
}
]
≤ α
}
, (4.1)
with α > 0, where Ns is the number of simulations of the processes in (2.1)-(2.2), τk is the
value at the k-th simulation of the bursting time τ of the bubble, and ρi,n,kt is the value of
ρi,nt computed in the k-th simulation.
The risk measure Riskiα as defined in (4.1) is analogous to the CoVar of a bank without the
bubble with respect to a bank with the bubble (for a definition of CoVar see e.g. Biagini
et al. [6] and Brunnermeier and Oehmke [12]). Note that, since the banks not holding the
bubble are identically distributed, we only compute the risk for one bank.
From now on, we set α = 0.05 in (4.1). We perform Ns = 10000 simulations of Risk
1
0.05 in
the case when there are n = 6 banks not holding the bubble and m = 2 banks holding it.
We consider different values of λ and of the delay δ.
The results are given in Table 1:
δ = 0 δ = 0.025 δ = 0.05 δ = 0.075 δ = 0.1 δ = 0.2 δ = 0.3
λ = 0.5 0.283 0.390 0.451 0.716 0.925 0.916 0.901
λ = 1 0.281 0.385 0.434 0.661 0.886 0.879 0.875
λ = 2 0.280 0.377 0.422 0.641 0.851 0.824 0.819
Table 1: Risk10.05 in the case when the robustness is given by (2.1)-(2.2), with parameters
σ1 = σ2 = 0.2, ∆ = 0.1, ρ
i,6
0 = ρ
k,B
0 = 0.5, i = 1, . . . , 6, k = 1, 2.
As expected, the risk is bigger for large delays, since a large delay means that the banks
without the bubble are not able to quickly disinvest, when other institutions holding the
bubble are in trouble. However, for delays larger than 0.1, the risk is still big but it decreases.
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This depends on the fact that we check the robustness of the banks at time τ + 0.1: at this
time, when δ = 0.2, 0.3, f is smaller than in the case δ = 0.1 because banks are cross
investing on each other according to a value of the robustness, which is realized much before
the bubble’s burst.
Moreover, the risk is decreasing with λ. Indeed, it follows by (2.1) that ρi,n reverts to
Ant +
1
λ
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
f(ρi,nt−δ −Ant−δ)(ρi,nt −Ant ) +
1
m− 1
m∑
ℓ=1,ℓ 6=k
f(ρℓ,Bt−δ −Ant−δ)(ρℓ,nt − Ant )
)
,
so that for large λ the term involving the network, and then the direct effects of the banks
holding the bubbly asset, is less significative.
We now consider (2.1)-(2.2) when β is replaced by β¯, where
dβ¯t =

0 for t ≤ τ,ρ1,β¯τ
ρ1,βτ
dβt for t ≥ τ,
(4.2)
where ρ1,β is the robustness of bank 1 when there is a bubble in the network, and ρ1,β¯ is
the robustness of bank 1 when there is no bubble. In this way we model the case when the
banks that used to hold the bubbly asset are subject at time τ to the same (relative) shock,
but without having experienced the growth of the bubble. The results are given in Table 2,
for the same parameters as in Table 1.
δ = 0 δ = 0.025 δ = 0.05 δ = 0.075 δ = 0.1 δ = 0.2 δ = 0.3
λ = 0.5 0.281 0.383 0.388 0.415 0.505 0.499 0.494
λ = 1 0.280 0.381 0.385 0.403 0.502 0.494 0.492
λ = 2 0.280 0.371 0.380 0.399 0.500 0.490 0.489
Table 2: Risk10.05 in the case when the robustness is given by (2.1)-(2.2) with no bubble in
the system, but with the same shock at time τ , for parameters σ1 = σ2 = 0.2, ∆ = 0.1,
ρi,60 = ρ
k,B
0 = 0.5, i = 1, . . . , 6, k = 1, 2.
We note that for δ = 0 there is not any significant difference with the case when there is a
bubble in the system, since the banks are able to disinvest immediately at the time when
the shock hits the banks with the bubble. Anyway, this difference increases with the delay.
When the delay is big, the banks with no bubble are much more in trouble in the first case,
i.e when they are attached to banks holding the bubbly asset.
We can then conclude that the increase of the value of the bubbly asset can put the network
in trouble, because it makes the system more centralized on the riskier banks, due to the
preferential attachment mechanism implied by (2.1)-(2.2).
26
This can also be seen by considering a static network, i.e. by taking fB = fP = 1 in (2.1)-
(2.2). In this case, we obtain the following values of the risk for different values of λ:
λ = 0.5 λ = 1 λ = 2
0.670 0.626 0.599
Table 3: Risk10.05 with ∆ = 0.1 in the case of a static network, with f
B = fP = 1 and with
parameters σ1 = σ2 = 0.2, ∆ = 0.1, ρ
i,6
0 = ρ
k,B
0 = 0.5, i = 1, . . . , 6, k = 1, 2..
Note that in this case the delay plays no role since it only affects the dynamics through fB
and fP . Comparing this result with Table 1, one can see that when δ in (2.1)-(2.2) is small,
then the fact that banks are able to quickly disinvest makes the system safer than in the case
of a static network. On the other hand, for big values of δ, a centralized network towards
the banks holding the bubble and the impossibility to disinvest quickly after the burst give
rise to a more dangerous system than in the static case.
4.2 Risk analysis for the mean field limit
We now consider the case of the limit system (3.1)-(3.3). We compute
Risk10.05 = − sup
x∈R
{[
1
Ns
Ns∑
k=1
1{
(ρ¯1,k
τk+∆
−ρ¯1,kτk )/ρ¯
1,k
τk
≤x
}
]
≤ 0.05
}
, (4.3)
where Ns and τk are the number of simulations and the time of the burst of the bubble in
the k-th simulation, respectively, and ρ¯1,kt is the value of ρ¯
1
t computed in the k-th simulation.
As before, we consider m = 2 banks holding the bubble and we make Ns = 10000 simulations
of (3.1)-(3.3) taking different values of λ and δ.
We compute φ(t, t − δ) = E [f (ρ˜it−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ]) (ρ˜it − E[ρ˜it])] in (3.2) and (3.3) via Monte
Carlo simulations of the trajectories of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in (3.1). Note that
E[ρ˜it] = ρ0e
−λt. The results are gathered in Table 4.
δ = 0 δ = 0.025 δ = 0.05 δ = 0.075 δ = 0.1 δ = 0.2 δ = 0.3
λ = 0.5 0.305 0.367 0.563 0.908 1.281 1.251 1.226
λ = 1 0.302 0.360 0.521 0.765 1.170 1.125 1.117
λ = 2 0.302 0.356 0.503 0.647 0.908 0.907 0.877
Table 4: Risk10.05 with ∆ = 0.1 of the mean field limit (3.1)-(3.3), with parameters σ1 =
σ2 = 0.2, ρ
k,B
0 = 0.5, k = 1, 2.
As before, the risk is increasing with the delay until δ = 0.1 and decreasing with λ, since ρ¯it
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reverts to
1
λ
(
ϕ(t, t− δ) + 1
m
m∑
k=1
f
(
ρ¯k,Bt−δ − νt−δ − E[ρ˜it−δ]
)(
ρ¯k,Bt − νt − E[ρ˜it]
))
+ E[ρ˜it]− ρ˜it,
so that a large λ diminishes the influence of the banks holding the bubbly asset.
We can also see that the risk is bigger at the limit by comparing (2.1) and (3.6): since
νt−δ+E[ρ˜
i
t] < A
n
t−δ, because the first term is the average robustness of banks not holding the
bubble, the argument of f is bigger in (3.6). This leads to a bigger weight multiplying the
loss at the moment of the burst at the limit.
In Table 5, we report the results for the case when β is replaced by β¯ as in (4.2), i.e. when
there is no bubble in the network.
δ = 0 δ = 0.025 δ = 0.05 δ = 0.075 δ = 0.1 δ = 0.2 δ = 0.3
λ = 0.5 0.303 0.355 0.468 0.682 0.698 0.659 0.645
λ = 1 0.302 0.347 0.410 0.528 0.640 0.628 0.627
λ = 2 0.300 0.340 0.395 0.455 0.612 0.561 0.550
Table 5: Risk10.05 with ∆ = 0.1 in the mean field limit (3.1)-(3.3) with no bubble, with
parameters σ1 = σ2 = 0.2, ρ
k,B
0 = 0.5, k = 1, 2.
As before, it can be seen that, when the delay is large enough, the preferential attachment
mechanism, that takes place during the ascending phase of the bubble, creates a network
more exposed to systemic risk at the time of the shock. If we consider a a static network,
with fB = fP = 1, the results, shown in Table 6, agree with the ones obtained in the case of
the finite network: for small delays the dynamic network is less exposed to systemic risk with
respect to the static one, whereas when the delay increases and the banks in the dynamic
network are slower in disinvesting, the risk is bigger than for the static network.
λ = 0.5 λ = 1 λ = 2
1.001 0.910 0.866
Table 6: Risk10.05 with ∆ = 0.1 in the case of a static network with f
B = fP = 1 in the
mean field limit, with parameters σ1 = σ2 = 0.2, ∆ = 0.1, ρ
k,B
0 = 0.5, k = 1, 2.
A Existence and uniqueness theorems
For the reader’s convenience we report here the results, which we have used in the paper
to prove existence and uniqueness of a strong solution of a system of stochastic differential
28
equations (SDEs) and of stochastic differential delay equations (SDDEs). These theorems
also guarantee the finiteness of the second moments of the strong solution.
In the following, let (Ω,F , P ) be a complete probability space with a filtration F := (Ft)t≥0
satisfying the usual conditions, and Bt = (B
1
t , . . . , B
m
t )t≥0, be an m-dimensional F-Brownian
motion defined on (Ω,F , P ).
We begin by the following existence and uniqueness result for a system of SDEs, given in
Theorem 9.11 in Pascucci [39].
Theorem A.1. Let X0 be an Ft0-measurable Rd-valued random variable such that E[X20 ] <
∞. Consider the d-dimensional stochastic differential equation of Itoˆ type
dXt = f(t, Xt)dt+ g(t, Xt)dBt, t0 ≤ t ≤ T, (A.1)
with Xt0 = X0, where f : [t0, T ] × Rd → Rd and g : [t0, T ] × Rd → Rd×m are both Borel
measurable.
Assume that there there exist two positive constants K1 and K2 such that:
1. (Lipschitz condition) for all x, y ∈ Rd and t ∈ [t0, T ],
‖f(t, x)− f(t, y)‖2 + ‖g(t, x)− g(t, y)‖2 ≤ K1‖x− y‖2;
2. (Linear growth condition) for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, T ]× Rd,
‖f(t, x)‖2 + ‖g(t, x)‖2 ≤ K2(1 + ‖x‖2).
Then there exists a unique solution X = (Xt)x∈[t0,T ] to equation (A.1) and it holds
E
[
sup
t0≤s≤t
‖Xs‖2
]
≤ C(1 + E [‖X0‖2])eCt, t ∈ [t0, T ], (A.2)
where C is a constant depending on K2 and T only.
We now recall Theorem 3.1 in Mao [36, chapter 5], that provides the existence and uniqueness
results for SDDEs.
Theorem A.2. Let F : [t0, T ] × Rd × Rd → Rd and G : [t0, T ] × Rd × Rd → Rd×m be
Borel-measurable. Consider the delay equation
dXt = F (t, Xt, Xt−τ )dt+G(t, Xt, Xt−τ )dBt, (A.3)
with initial data {Xs : t0− τ ≤ s ≤ t0}, such that Xs is Ft0-measurable for all s ∈ [t0− τ, t0]
and E[‖Xs‖2] <∞ for all s ∈ [t0 − τ, t0].
Assume that there exists two positive constants K˜1 and K˜2 such that
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1. (Linear growth condition) for all (t, x, y) ∈ [t0, T ]× Rd × Rd,
‖F (t, x, y)‖2 + ‖G(t, x, y)‖2 ≤ K˜1(1 + ‖x‖2 + ‖y‖2);
2. (Lipschitz condition on x) for all t ∈ [t0, T ], y ∈ Rd and x, x¯ ∈ Rd,
‖F (t, x, y)− F (t, x¯, y)‖2 + ‖G(t, x, y)−G(t, x¯, y)‖2 ≤ K˜2‖x− x¯‖2.
Then there exists a unique solution X = (Xt)t∈[t0,T ] to equation (A.3).
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